Security policy

sigelo is maintained by one pseudonymous person, csigelo, who alone reads reports. You need not give a real name. All contacts: https://sigelo.io/contact.html.

Built and operated by an AI agent (Claude, did:sigelo:zDRrj7eGWXQtmzPUKF3zPDjhUkH7FebKRGj8rf96SdoLa) under a human owner, csigelo. No third party has audited it yet. Review findings are welcome through the channels below.

Official channels

These are the only official names; anything else that claims to be sigelo is not us.

• Domains: sigelo.io; sigelo.net, sigelo.org, sigelo.online, sigelo.dev, sigelo.ai only redirect to it. Repository: https://github.com/csigelo/sigelo, the only one.
• Releases: only that repository's Releases page and https://sigelo.io/releases/, always with SHA256SUMS; from v0.1.1 also an SSH-signed tag (/.well-known/sigelo-release-signers) and a release.json signed by did:sigelo:zE1ikihiqKQ7KoFL492kfFrJdUSzPeHNunGnMXLqgVfci — release/verify-release.sh <tag> checks all three; a release without them is not ours.
• Maintainer: csigelo (GitHub), no other name. E-mail: contact@sigelo.io and security@sigelo.io, receive-only for now.
• npm: sigelo, sigelo-agent, sigelo-spend, sigelo-mcp, sigelo-recovery-kit, published by the npm user csigelo. Until they appear there, any package with these names is not ours.
• The sigelo.io world's issuer DID is did:sigelo:zEqNZjQDBiiufPs4NHrLw1kJD8rBitbFPyoQJoKuJFTM7, its genesis at https://sigelo.io/world/genesis.json and its rotation chain at https://sigelo.io/world/rotations.json. The previous DID did:sigelo:zBASk7w9zUhCYuuEpcUDSAuBUPW7qSAjAjAYARDCJ4S2Q was retired by a precautionary recovery rotation on 2026-10-03: do not trust attestations from it. An attestation from any other issuer is not from sigelo.io.
• Nobody from the project will ever ask for a seed, key, token or payment by e-mail or chat.

Report impersonation to security@sigelo.io. Machine-readable: official in https://sigelo.io/index.json.

Reporting

1. GitHub private vulnerability reporting on this repository ("Security" → "Report a vulnerability").
2. E-mail security@sigelo.io (receive-only for now: the reply comes over SimpleX or a channel you name). An age recipient will be published at https://sigelo.io/.well-known/security.txt; until then assume mail is not private.
3. SimpleX: https://smp10.simplex.im/a#18LjfJawmkVxvFtCHFo-yyzPo8Kr3gPLNts_ovwxmZM (public SimpleX relays; also general contact).

Say what you ran, against which commit, what happened and what you expected; a failing vector, bundle or request beats prose. State what you did not verify.

Scope

• SPEC.md and test-vectors.json: any bundle two conformant verifiers disagree on, a wrong vector, any rule that lets a stolen key or a malformed object win.
• ts/ (library, vector generator, sigelo-offline, ceremony) and go/ (sigelo-verify, keys.go).
• spend/, the keeper: account pinning, caps, delegation, approvals, the two-phase relay, tokens, spend.log integrity, sigelo-wallet output an attacker can shape.
• adapters/1f916, adapters/moadim, and release artefacts (binaries, SHA256SUMS, release.json).

Out of scope: Monero, monero-wallet-rpc, monerod and stock wallets (report upstream; sigelo using them unsafely is in scope); what THREAT-MODEL.md §3 says sigelo does not defend; social engineering; denial of service against the site or MCP endpoint (verification is offline). Bugs that move stagenet or testnet coins are in scope.

What to expect

Acknowledgement within 72 hours; a fix or a public advisory explaining why not within 90 days, sooner if exploited. Credit under the name you choose, or none. No bounty until funded.

Safe harbour

Good-faith research on your own keys, identities, keepers and wallets, on stagenet or testnet, will not be pursued. Do not touch others' keepers, tokens, wallets or identities, do not spend coins that are not yours, and do not publish before 90 days or a fix, whichever is first, unless agreed. Unsure? Ask first.

A live keeper compromise

Act first: follow INCIDENT.md (stop, sweep to the vault, recovery-rotate). Then report if you suspect a sigelo bug, with the preserved spend.log (no secrets; redact destinations if you must). Never send spend.key, a token, a seed or the 25 words to anyone, including us.

Not yet externally reviewed

External review targets, in order:

1. go/jcs.go, ts/src/jcs.ts — canonicalisation and the strict parser.
2. go/sigelo.go, ts/src/sigelo.ts — chain walk, precedence, forks, cycles, discard.
3. go/monero.go, ts/src/monero.ts — Keccak, base58, point decoding, SigV2, subaddresses.
4. ts/src/keys.ts, go/keys.go — HKDF paths, sc_reduce32, the 25-word mnemonic.
5. ts/src/ceremony.ts, ts/src/offline.ts — secret handling, age invocation.
6. spend/service.ts, approval.ts, tree.ts, policy.ts — the keeper.

The keeper is experimental and stagenet-only until this list is reviewed.