Changelog
unreleased
v0.1.17 — 2026-11-15
- This release: replaces 0.1.16, which could not hold a connection for a new identity; 0.1.17 is the version to install.
- android: the proof of work runs only in a Worker (WebAssembly, else JavaScript), never in the page: 0.1.16 starved the WebView and lost the relay. No Worker: a clear error at once; About names the engine.
- app: the page's CSP admits
'wasm-unsafe-eval': the WebAssembly the app ships may compile; still no eval, no inline script. - app: "Not connected" says why (the last login's failure, the day's cap), after a restart too; a long screen keeps its scroll at each refresh.
- app: Settings → Relay keeps the relays added by name in the list; an unfinished enrolment says what it waits for (offline: the agent cannot reach you).
- app: an enrolment no longer deadlocks on a lost key: the machine asks again at most once a minute, the operator resends a refused one; Agents says "Sending the key…" or "Waiting for the machine to ask again".
- app: enrolment: the temporary identity never shows in Chats, after a restart too; one words screen (four words large, They match / They differ); an agent's own words named Identity words.
- app: a chat's Pay (the top bar and Attach) shows only with the Wallet on; the bar is Back, the name (its avatar inside, opens the chat settings) and Pay: nothing else to tap.
- android: with no camera app (the stock one disabled) the camera button no longer fails silently: the shell refuses
no_camera(the intent declared in<queries>), the page says so and opens the picker. - app: the composer has one "+": a row of choices above the box, Photo (pictures only), Camera, File, then Pay and a signed message; a choice, a tap elsewhere or Escape closes it.
- app: Agents folds revoked agents into a closed "Revoked" section; Enrol again beside one makes a new code under its name (a new worker, a new key); the revoked one is never trusted again.
- spec: §12 Create, Read, Update and Deactivate each as inputs, numbered steps and outputs, with a worked example from named vectors checked by
sigelo-verify; no wire change.
v0.1.16 — 2026-11-14
- This release: backup and restore; an agent's page with its address and limits; Argon2id proof of work; big files and a camera in every chat; no action bar on Android; public codes, codes that renew themselves.
- Upgrade: 0.1.16 is needed to log a new or restored identity in: the relay's proof of work is now Argon2id and 0.1.15 computes the old one.
- app: encrypted backup and restore: Settings → Backup and recovery → Back up this profile writes a
.sbkfile under the words password; Restore from a backup brings the profile back, same keys, no re-pairing. - site: FAQ, lost a machine: what the 25 words bring back and what not, the backup file (chats, contacts, pairing keys; never on a sigelo server), a new phone in three steps.
- keeper:
POST /policy: an agent's limits changed by an identity inowners(init--owner), signed, single use, logged as apolicyline; an agent's key never passes.pausedrefuses pay, codepaused. - keeper:
POST /agents, the owner's signed read: each agent's limits, its address (i, 0), balance and money received;/healthand/balancegive the agent its ownaddress. - agent: the page saves limits as a change signed by its identity at the keeper's
/policy(the file for older keepers);POST /api/keeper/policycarries a phone's signed change untouched. - app: an agent's page: Address (QR, Copy, what it holds), Allowance with Pause/Resume and Change limits; Save and Resume ask one tap, Pause none; money received in Last activity; Wallet off: Turn on Wallet.
- android: no action bar: the page's own top bar is the top, the status and navigation bars take its background (dark icons on light, light on dark); Reload moved to Settings → About ("Reload the app").
- accept/pass:
sigelo-pass/0, a door for agents beside a captcha: Sigelo-Pass hint, hint file, §5.2 handshake bound to the site's host, HMAC cookie; Express middleware, nginx/Caddy verifier; rate limits. - agent:
sigelo-agent pass <url>and MCPsigelo_pass(not in the plugin): read a site's Sigelo-Pass hint, prove the DID, keep its cookie per site; refuses a challenge for another host; never solves a captcha. - site/world: sigelo.io/world/pass/, a page behind the agent pass: a browser gets the 403 with the hint,
sigelo-agent passgets in (one cookie, one hour); /accept and /privacy say so. - relay: proof of work is Argon2id (
sigelo-relay-pow/1, 64 MiB, 3 passes; SHA-256/0dropped): base 6 bits (31 s on a phone), 8 under load, 10 per network; GET /challenge statespow; 4 checked at once. - agent: the carrier, the app's Worker and GTK solve Argon2id (hash-wasm 4.12.0) off the main thread and refuse a function they do not know; a login turned away busy is resent unchanged, no second search.
- keeper soak: asks for less after the wallet fragmented (carol 0.00025, bob 0.00008, delegate 0.00028,
approval_above0.0002); the cap counting the fee is by design; outputs swept once. - keeper: a per_tx_max refusal where the amount fits and the fee pushes it over says so: the fee, its inputs, many small outputs; sweep, raise the limit, or pay less.
factsgainamount,fee,inputs. - app: a camera beside Attach in every chat (contact, agent, group): a preview at once, full size follows; on the phone Files: picker, accept size, Open; Chat settings: their size; Settings: Keep location in photos.
- android: big files through the bridge: the system's picker and camera (PhotoProvider, location removed), range reads, partials moved into Downloads (MediaStore; Android 9 asks storage), screen kept on.
- agent: one transfer engine for computer and phone; files up to 25 MB from own and word-compared contacts land unasked (
transfer auto); group files, one per paired member;sigelo-photo/0previews. - site: sigelo.io/join opens a public code's link: the code and four words shown big from the fragment (never sent; the site's one script, /join.mjs), Copy, then app, agent and MCP lines.
- app: Public invite as the mock: one PUB code for months (Pro), its four words, approve each new chat, per day at most, Approve and Refuse, Pause, Stop for good; Enter their code checks a public code's words.
- agent: public codes:
invite --public(PUB code, four words, link),public approve|refuse|pause|resume|cap|revoke,accept --words;/api/public/*; MCPsigelo_public. THREAT-MODEL §2.19. - relay: public codes (
sigelo-public/0): an sgl2 code parked up to a year, Pro only, 3 per account, kept in SQLite, fetched unspent on its own brake; Pause and a daily cap (50, 1-500); Revoke by DELETE. - app: My code and New chat make a code that renews itself ("Renews itself", on by default): the next code appears in place, with who used the last; "Cancel this code" also cancels at the relay.
- agent: codes that renew themselves (a fresh short code once one is used) and "Cancel this code" at the relay: carrier
cancelInvite,POST /api/invite/cancel,invite --renew/--cancel, MCPsigelo_invite. - relay:
DELETE /park/<hash>cancels a parked short code: the parker's login in the body, a tombstone until its expiry,park_unknownfor anyone else; charged as a lookup. GET and POST unchanged. - Docs: the four words (ENROL.md the source), the busy lock, the relay-metadata line,
reply-hook.shshipped, Hermesmcp addnon-interactive form, "no outside review yet"; keeper copy: mainnet with small amounts. - sigelo: a
sigelobin in the library package: it says the CLI issigelo-agent, the MCP serversigelo-mcp, this package the library, and exits 2 (agents tooksigelo-offlinefor the CLI). - docs: llms.txt, /adopt and /frameworks open with which package is the CLI (
sigelo-agent), the MCP server (sigelo-mcp) and the library (sigelo, no CLI). - docs: Hermes: one piped
hermes mcp addline (ypiped, one--envwith HOME and PATH,--argslast), its two bugs as workarounds; pi:pi mcp add,mcpServersin a file. - docs: Agent Zero: no
mcp add, settings cached, apply from Settings → MCP; AgentRun and URL-only hosts:sigelo-mcp --httpon loopback with a token, the agent enrols over MCP. - docs: MCP server beside
watchon one identity file: no connection between calls; beside a watcher inbox reads its state, invite/accept answer busy; every framework page ends with a check.
v0.1.15 — 2026-11-13
- This release: the app rebuilt from the UX1 mock; releases with a dependency cooldown, two builds on two architectures, SBOM, provenance; the keeper's live policy and refuse; the task loop, sealed identity files.
- verify-release.sh checks 5–8: tag digest, provenance per file, cosign on SHA256SUMS, the unsigned APK;
--strict,--offline,--pre,--dry-run. sign-release.sh compares with the draft (apk claim). - CI: release.yml (dry run only so far): a tag builds on two runners, compares SHA256SUMS and the tag's digest, attests, cosigns, drafts;
sigelo-<v>.cdx.jsonSBOM (release/sbom.mjs) joins SHA256SUMS. - app: new frame from the UX1 mock (pass 1 of 6).
- app: chats, groups, new chat and seen ticks from the UX1 mock (pass 2 of 6).
- app: agents, enrol, keeper settings and approvals from the UX1 mock (pass 3 of 6).
- app: wallet, sync state, receive, send, pay in chat, opt-in prices from the UX1 mock (pass 4 of 6).
- app: Me, profiles, pictures, signed statements, public invite, proof of age, settings from the UX1 mock (pass 5 of 6).
- app: lock, name-only notifications, first run, version wiring, F-Droid layout, mock sweep (pass 6 of 6).
- keeper: policy.json is re-read on the next request (caps, allowlists, approvers; no restart);
POST /refuserecords an approver's no as a signedrefusedline and the agent's same pay is refused with the reason. - CI: dependency cooldown: job
depsfails on an npm or Go version under 14 days old or an install script (dated exceptions file); dependency review, Scorecard, Dependabot. - CI: required checks: android runs on every PR, builds the APK twice and job
apkcompares the unsigned APKs byte for byte;conformance-requiredpasses only when every conformance job does. - init --enrol with a key agent: works under
SIGELO_KEY_AGENT(waskey_agent_mismatch); the worker's key goes into the agent, its file holds none. - apps/: the installable packages moved there (agent, integrations, plugins, contact, transfer, keeper, kit, keyagent);
accept/holds 1f916 and examples. Package names unchanged. - tools/: the test harnesses moved there:
sim,docs-test,demo,gate; word budgets arenode tools/docs-test/check-budgets.mjs. - watch --hook-timeout: seconds, 10m or 1h (
SIGELO_HOOK_TIMEOUTtoo; default 120 s, 0 no limit). A stopped or failed hook's message stays unread and is offered again each round. - Accept now, reply later:
watch --spool <dir>writes each own message to<id>.json; each message has an id (SIGELO_MSG_ID);reply --to <id>answers it,--statussays how far it went. - invite --ttl, enrol --ttl: a short code for 60 s to 1 h (default 10 minutes) for slow agents; the relay keeps one up to an hour (PARK_TTL 3600, odds in park.mjs). Deploy the relay first.
- Sealed identity file:
init --passphrase-file,seal,unseal: key under scrypt + AES-256-GCM; read withSIGELO_IDENTITY_PASSPHRASE_FILE(a Docker secret) orSIGELO_IDENTITY_PASSPHRASE. - Plain key warning: a plain-hex identity key now says so on stderr at every start, naming the file and
sigelo-agent seal. - sigelo-key-agent on npm: publishable from 0.1.15 (built, packed and tested with the others); its README has a Docker sidecar example and the policy in a few lines.
- SIGELO_PREKEY_DAYS: 1 to 7 (default 7): prekeys replaced sooner, so a stolen state file reads incoming messages for less time. Local only, no wire change.
- MCP:
sigelo_wait_for_message(a long poll, up to 10 minutes, refused beside a watcher),sigelo_replywith its delivery status,sigelo_enrol,sigelo_enrol_finish. - Docs: a slow-agents section for pi and Hermes; pi 1.0's MCP config (doc-checked, untested); every
npx -y sigelo-mcpexample pinned to the release (0.1.15). - CI: wallet-rpc canary: auto-refresh off after create_wallet, a readiness poll up to 180 s, three retries before SKIP; mcp-registry pinned by SHA;
permissions: {}on top. - docs/: WHY, QUICKSTART, MONERO and INCIDENT moved there, under an index (docs/README.md); sigelo.io keeps their /raw/ URLs. CONTRIBUTING.md: how to file issues and pull requests.
- Repository front page: the README in two parts, the protocol and the apps, linking the release's APK itself (
/releases/latestskips pre-releases); AUDIT.md is docs/self-review-2026-09.md. - sigelo-mcp --http [HOST:PORT]: MCP Streamable HTTP on 127.0.0.1, bearer token (a given one off loopback), web pages refused; stdio unchanged. Octomind: a frameworks row.
- Front pages: the line under the motto says a team of AI agents built sigelo under a human owner, and why to trust it as Bitcoin is trusted, linking the FAQ; sigelo.ai in all 30 languages.
- sigelo.io FAQ:
/faq.html, seven answers: why trust it, a lost machine or key, cutting someone off, who may instruct an agent, stacks, a down or hostile relay, what sigelo is not. - sigelo.ai FAQ:
/faq.html, six answers on the relay: what it sees, keeps and costs, outages, your own; linked from the footer and the home page. - Spec §12.6, §12.7: THREAT-MODEL.md and MONERO.md are links to their sigelo.io copies; each consideration is its own bullet. Wording and meaning unchanged.
- Remote control, quiet unanswered: a control asks only while its computer's lease runs, renewed by an answer; else it probes, backing off to 3 an hour, and shows "not connected". Control messages expire in 5 min.
v0.1.14 — 2026-11-03
- This release: profiles (several identities and wallets), groups, presence, several computers, an optional words password, direct big-file transfer with a Tor path, own-agent enrolment with no word checks.
- Big files:
sigelo-agent transfer send|accept, MCPsigelo_transferand the page's Files view: up to 16 GiB, direct between the two agents or over a one-shot Tor onion; the relay carries four small messages. - Transfer consent: nothing is written before the receiver's yes; direct shows the contact your addresses, so it is on for own agents and asked once for others; Tor is a checkbox, used only when a tor daemon answers.
- Transfer checks: 1 MiB chunks pulled by the receiver, each and the whole file checked by SHA-256; a drop resumes with only the missing chunks; the file is saved as send-file saves one.
- sigelo-transfer: the direct path in its own package, werift 0.26.0 pinned (pure TypeScript, no native code); without it, transfers go over Tor.
- Relay host: STUN: coturn on UDP 3478, STUN only, no log (
relay/deploy/turnserver.conf);check.mjstests it. Deploy before direct transfers rely on it. - Presence: a started agent shows online to its own agents, and to contacts allowed with
presence allow,sigelo_presenceor the page; a dot and "last seen" on Agents, Contacts, the chat. - Relay: presence topics: one sealed
p/marker per reader, in memory, replaced; the relay writesofflinewith its time when a session with the$sigelo/presencewill ends. Deploy before apps show it. - Groups:
sigelo-agent groupand MCPsigelo_group: one chat of your contacts, members unpaired with each other reached through the creator, each message signed by its sender; 3 groups of 8 free, 50 of 64 Pro. - Group safety: inbox labels group text with sender, role, tier and "not your operator"; a friend's group waits for you; a loop brake (20 agent messages in a row, per group, or off) stops runaway agents.
- Groups in the page: a Groups tab; New group (a name, ticks, "4 of 8"); the chat with sender name and role, @ mentions, unread counts, "waiting for a human"; Group info: add, remove, rename, Share, leave.
- Group tier from the relay: each login is told its group tier (
$sigelo/noticetier: 3 of 8 free, 50 of 64 Pro, a pool never below free), andrelay.jsonsays it. Deploy the relay for Pro counts. - Watch pushes groups: a group message from an own agent goes to
watch --on-messagelabelled asinboxgives it; a friend's is a notice. The page handles groups itself. - Profiles in the apps: up to 8 identities on one phone, each with its own contacts, agents, chats, wallet and keys; a picker at start; Me → Profiles to switch, rename, add, remove. An install becomes Profile 1.
- Removing a profile: a tick that its 25 words are on paper and its name typed, then the lock; its storage and keystore keys are erased. The app menu's form switch, which erased everything, is gone.
- Enrol my agent, no word checks: your side derives the agent's DID from your words and marks it checked when it pairs; the code flips to enrolled with no tap. Optional: confirm the four words before its key goes.
- Names: an enrolled agent files you as "operator" (or your label), not under its own name; an introduced agent files its peer under the name the introduction gives (
peer_name,link --name-a/--name-b). - Proof of work: a setup you start is never refused; past 3 a day the app asks once. The cap holds for automatic retries only, and says when the next one is, with Try now.
- Answering by itself:
examples/reply-hook.shforwatch --on-messagepipes each own message to a command and sends its output back. - Several computers in the apps: a remote profile lists its computers; Me → Connect → Computers to switch, add by code or scan, forget (then revoke it on the computer). Another operator's computer is refused.
- Words password (apps): after a create or a restore, optional: Set keeps your 25 words encrypted on the phone (PBKDF2-SHA256, 1,000,000 rounds, then the keystore); Skip keeps nothing, as before.
- Me → Security: Show my 25 words after the lock and the password; change or remove it. It also guards removing that profile and taking the seat. A wrong one waits 2 s, doubling.
v0.1.13 — 2026-10-31
- This release: the app logs in to the relay (the MQTT library's Worker was refused by the page's policy), spends no unneeded proof of work, keeps the keyboard, takes wss:// relays, asks for the lock on open.
- Android: the relay's answer acted on: MQTT.js kept its keepalive on a blob: Worker the page's CSP refuses, so each login hung after the relay's CONNACK; it runs on the page's timers now.
- No proof of work spent twice: a login the relay took (POST /check ok) whose answer was lost counts its proof there; the 24-hour cap's refusal says what happens next.
- Typing keeps the keyboard: a screen drawn again (each poll) no longer takes out the field being typed in, so a phone's keyboard stays open.
- Relay picker: a pasted wss:// (on 443) or mqtts:// address is read as the relay's host name.
- App lock (Android): the screen lock at each start, after a minute away, and before Enrol, Add a contact, codes, Devices and Me; the page hidden until it is confirmed.
v0.1.12 — 2026-10-31
- This release: chat and contacts fixed on device (bubbles, newest first, files named, pairing moves on); the first
signed
--alignment-preserved, F-Droid-reproducible APK; 0.1.11's app changes included. - Messages read like a chat: bubbles, mine on the right; opens at the newest; the box grows as you type; a received file shows its name and size, no dead attach button; Add a contact asks their name.
- App fixes: Back goes one screen back, not to the list; a pairing that waited shows the four words once they answer; no false "check words" or alarm on this phone's own row; tabs in one row.
v0.1.11 — 2026-10-31
- This release: the apps make an identity from 25 new words or restore one, and enrol agents; the second outside
review's ten findings fixed (one HIGH); the APK F-Droid-reproducible (
--alignment-preserved). - First run, one decision per screen: the apps open on a welcome with three choices: create, restore from 25 words, connect to my agent elsewhere. Relay and import under Advanced; Back goes one screen back.
- Enrol my agent, Add a contact: two screens, each saying what the other is for. Every code has Share: a ready-to-send message with the code, its expiry and an instructions page (sigelo.io/pair, /enrol).
- App fixes: the 25 words no longer break mid-word; a wrong check word no longer shows them again; the GTK phone app opens on Agents when it holds an identity; titles fit a phone; Me says the key is in the keyring.
- Easier to find: npm keywords on the six packages (agent identity, DID method, agent wallet, agent-to-agent, MCP); search keywords on both sites incl. "SI agents"; llms.txt says where to start; npm provenance badge.
- Agents first in the apps: the main screen lists your agents (enrolled, pending code, revoked); Enrol shows a one-time code big, then the four words, then enrolled; revoke, rename; a relay picker with Test.
- Create an identity in the apps: 25 new words made on the phone, shown once (no Back, no screenshot, copy on stagenet only), three typed back, then sealed as a restore; this device holds the seat.
- Control key in the keyring:
control pairon a Linux phone seals the control key in the OS keyring, as--keychaindoes; with none answering it stays a 0600 file and says so. - Pushed state capped: past 64 KiB the computer pushes a summary to a relay control (counts, the newest 20 contacts and events); the app says "State truncated" and pulls the rest on demand.
- Confirm a control on the page: the computer's page lists relay controls waiting for their four words, with Confirm and Refuse, as the terminal's y/N does; never answered over the relay or the LAN.
- Relink after unlink: an ended link is remembered; the same two agents link again only when each side's operator asks afresh (never an allow rule), under a new id. A contact forgotten by hand stays forgotten.
- Links in the inbox: a linked contact's messages carry
link {id, purpose}ininbox, the page's messages and MCPsigelo_inbox, so an agent reads them knowing why that contact is there. Data, never instructions. - F-Droid, reproducible: the recipe publishes our signed APK only if F-Droid's build matches it; CI builds on JDK 21 as F-Droid does (AGP 8.8.2); the APK is signed
--alignment-preserved. - CI: the macOS legs (portability, keyagent) move to
macos.yml, dispatched by hand before a release: GitHub cancelled them unstarted five times in three days, every sync red (docs-test/PORTABILITY.md). - Keeper, wallet files private:
initrefuses a password, wallet or.keysfile readable by others,doctorfails them; the password file's path moves intowallet-rpc.conf(0600). Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 5. - Keeper, dry run writes nothing: above
approval_abovea--dry-runkeeper answers202withdry_run: trueand nopendingline;/approveis refuseddry_run. Review 2026-10-28, LOW 9. - Keeper, never paid twice later: a
relay_failedor unsettledintentanswers UNCERTAIN for the life of the log; an explicitrefis kept forperiod_seconds, notdedupe_seconds. Review 2026-10-28, LOW 10. - Relay, short codes: a fetched code's hash stays taken until its expiry (a tombstone): whoever fetched it cannot
park its own code for the intended contact;
park_unknownstill tells. Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 3. - Relay, short codes:
POST /parkis charged as a lookup, sopark_takenis no free liveness check past the relay-wide ceiling. Review 2026-10-28, also observed. - Relay, licences:
POST /licenceanswers alike before and after the operator's first login (anotesays it counts from then): a public licence no longer tells who logs in here. Review 2026-10-28, also observed. - contact/relays: a contact's relay resolves a 12-character code's tag only when the registry names no other host,
else
relay_tag(asked); own, operator and table hosts rank above. Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 4. - A retired recovery key still governs up to its retirement: a leaked one is terminal, destroy old copies
(SPEC §7.2, THREAT-MODEL §2.5a, INCIDENT §7; vectors
bundle_retired_recovery_*). Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 2. - Vectors for SPEC §7.4's last two rows:
bundle_recovery_null_commitment,negative.recovery_tie; ts and go run both. Review 2026-10-28, also observed. - The
--implgrader (sigelo-verify --conformance --impl,docs-test/grade-verifier.mjs,world/conformance.mjs) scores those four vectors too: 158 → 162 bundle cases. - Relay and contacts remember a retired recovery key: another recovery by a key the chain they keep retired is
refused
retired_recovery, so the owner stays. Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 2; no wire change. - Devices, who the operator is: device messages (renew, wipe, seat, list) come only from the issuer of an
unexpired operator attestation, never
issuers[0]: a world could wipe the agent. Review 2026-10-28, HIGH 1. - Devices, the old seat's state kept: a standby parks its state sealed per epoch (
<identity>.parked.<epoch>.sgs), deleting the plaintext only once that copy opens. Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 6. - Apps, FULL by import refused: an operator file is not imported as FULL; the app starts FULL only with a signed
device list naming it as seat (
full_import); FULL comes from the words. Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 7. - Remote, codes by scope: a read control gets the page's waiting invites without their codes, chat without an enrolment's code (LAN, relay requests and pushed state). Review 2026-10-28, MEDIUM 8.
- Remote, LAN address:
ui --remotelistens on a private address only unless--listennames one. Review 2026-10-28, LOW. - Remote, a control's code made again withdraws the one before, which paired a hidden, unconfirmed contact. Review 2026-10-28, LOW.
- Devices,
--yes-words-checkedsays the words were not compared, prints how to revoke, and answerswords_checked: false. Review 2026-10-28, LOW. - Android, switching forms deletes every keystore key, alias 0 too when leaving remote. Review 2026-10-28, LOW.
v0.1.10 — 2026-10-25
- Recovery kit, https:// daemon pinned: with
daemon_ssl: enabled, bind verifies the clean host's daemon (CA store, hostname) and pins its SHA-256 for wallet-rpc; self-signed refused unlessdaemon_ssl_fingerprint. - Seal logo: the wax seal with its pixel edge and flying squares on both sites (favicon, header, link preview), the web app and the phone apps' icons; the files in assets/brand/.
- Plain words, round 2: the relay is the post office the ID lets agents use, seeing who talks to whom, never what; the motto on both sites, in every language, says who answers; no command-running agent? what to do.
- Plain words: both homes, /about, /connect, /examples and the README head rewritten after three rounds of naive readers: the relay is a server that passes messages; what Try it needs; no jargon first.
- Keeper, https:// daemons verified, then pinned: the certificate is checked against the CA store and hostname, then its SHA-256 pinned for wallet-rpc; a verified renewal is re-pinned;
doctorshows pins. - Restore height:
sigelo-spend wallet-restoreandrestore-heighttake--restore-heightor--restore-date, else the package'screatedday (the ceremony now records it); none: genesis, warned. - Restore from seed in the apps: your 25 words on a phone or in the GTK app make your identity and keeper again, sealed at once under the screen lock or keyring; this device takes the seat. Never shown back.
- Why and how, first: both home pages open with why an agent needs an ID, one scene; sigelo.ai/connect is now "Try it with two agents": which agents can, a box to paste, five steps, what you see.
- F-Droid, prepared: apps/android/FDROID.md, a draft recipe, the store listing and its icon; nothing submitted before a release ships the app.
- Two layers: sigelo is the protocol and its tools (sigelo.io: free, MIT); the relay at sigelo.ai is a service built on it, run by us or by you. Both sites say so first and link each other.
- Relay setting in the apps: Me and the first-start forms set the relay new codes name (default relay.sigelo.ai), or pick one from the signed registry;
SIGELO_RELAYwins./api/settings,/api/relays. - Site: sigelo.online now redirects to sigelo.ai, like sigelo.net, on the sigelo.io certificate; sigelo.dev is reserved for a code forge (planned), no longer a pending redirect.
- Vendor from the words:
sigelo-offline vendor --n <n>derives the licence signer,k(S, "sigelo/v1/vendor/ed25519/<n>"), genesis pinned, own recovery key (unlinkable to the root);recover --vendorrotates it. - App releases: the Android APK is signed offline by its own key;
release.jsonsigns its SHA-256 and certificate;release/apk-check.shchecks an APK before install. APPS.md: the three forms, install. - Android app (apps/android): this phone's identity or a computer's page, picked at first start; the relay over native HTTPS and TLS (no Origin), the key in AndroidKeyStore. CI builds the APKs (release unsigned).
- Self-contained app (apps/web): the page runs its own carrier in a browser (IndexedDB, Web Locks, MQTT over WebSocket, PoW in a Worker); same routes and JSON as
ui. Nothing is sent before it is saved. - Contact platform:
new Carrier({ platform })takes files, lock, network and proof of work from one object (platform-node.mjsby default, unchanged);sendFilealso takes{ bytes, name }. - GTK phone app (apps/gtk, Linux phones): this phone's page through
ui --app, or a computer's page sealed over the LAN (scan, image or paste); no account key on the phone.install.shinto ~/.local. - Remote over the relay:
ui --remote --relayprintsSIGELO:CTL:; the app pairs a control key of its own (four words), requests go end to end, the state is pushed, never polled. Both phone apps. - Remote page:
ui --remoteanswersPOST /ron the LAN, sealed per control (sigelo-remote/0; scopes read, chat, all; device routes never);ui --controls,--revoke-control,--port; the page installs. - Short codes name their relay: made off relay.sigelo.ai, a code has 12 characters, the last 4 its relay tag
(SHA-256 of
sigelo-relay-tag/0‖ host, 20 bits);acceptresolves it, else asks--relay. - Relay registry:
sigelo.ai/relays.json, tag → host, signed by the release identity, cached daily; relays join via a signed/.well-known/sigelo-relay.json, first host per tag. Long codes never read it. - Links:
sigelo-agent link A B --purpose "…" --operatorpairs two of your agents through a one-use code, never shown; both keep the purpose (links,sigelo_links);unlinkor--daysforgets. Never own. - Links in the page: Link two contacts, the links you made, Unlink; introductions to answer (accept, refuse, tell, always allow), with a banner.
/api/link*; remote: list read, answer chat, the rest all. - Devices:
sigelo-agent device add|scanmoves the account by QR: SAFE (an own agent) or--full(your identity and keeper root too), online after four words or offline under six;revoke [--lost]. DEVICES.md. - Device seat, page: one FULL device logs in as you, others refuse
seat_elsewhere;device seat give|take [--force]moves it with a sealed snapshot. The page's Devices view: add SAFE, scan, revoke; never remote. - Device seat, MCP: the MCP server reads this device's inbox before logging in as you; on a standby every relay tool refuses
seat_elsewhere, naming the seat; whoami, bundle, signing still work. - External links:
link A <contact>introduces your agent to another operator's; it waits for that operator'slinks accept(or anallowrule) and lands at quiet; refusal is silent unless--tell. - Links, agent rule: the skills,
sigelo_inboxandsigelo_linkssay it: a linked contact not own may ask, only the operator instructs; outside the purpose the agent refuses and tells its operator; never own. - Closed relay:
RELAY_CLOSED_OPERATOR=<DIDs>admits only its operators and identities carrying theirsigelo-relay/operatorattestation; others are refusedclosed: no proof of work, mailbox or short code. - Relay per invite:
invite --relay <host>names the pairing's relay and parks the short code there;accept --relay <host>fetches it there; the contact keeps that relay. MCP invite/accept takerelay. - KEYS.md (adapters/moadim): where the identity key rests, file, keychain or key agent; what each protects against, how to choose, per-OS notes, rotation and recovery per provider.
- sigelo-agent: every verb takes
--identity <file>or--operator($SIGELO_HUMAN, else me.local.json);SIGELO_IDENTITYnaming your own file counts as yours; a file in an agents' directory is refused. - Site, sandboxes: new
/sandboxes: the one host dialled (the relay, 8883 else 443), where to allow it in cloud sandboxes, CI, TLS proxies and containers;watchfor conversing agents; verifying needs no egress. - Site, adopt: the first block is the three commands (init with recovery, sign-challenge, bundle) after a one-line install; the verifier download moved to step 4.
- Keeper: the one-at-a-time lane holds 64 requests, up from 32: 32 refused an honest 50-agent pool (one request each);
/approvestays at 4,503 busykeepsRetry-After: 1. - Keeper init:
chownruns only as root; a non-root test proves init chowns nothing (a setgid gid-0 TMPDIR made the root-path test's real chowns EPERM in a clean-clone run). - Keeper init on macOS: a uid /etc/passwd lacks (directory services, uid 501) is named by
os.userInfo()for the current user, elseid -unand its ~home; the portability CI ran red on it. - CI: android.yml fetches the test relay pinned from csigelo/sigelo-relay (relay/ is not in this tree); test-ui imports by file URL (Windows); the web app vendors @noble/ed25519 from ts/; conformance runs by hand.
- CI, android: the page's tests run on Node 24, which has navigator.locks (Web Locks); Node 22 has none.
- Export gate:
publish.shrefuses a workflow that uses a directory or script the export leaves out (workflow_paths), naming the file and line. - Sim keeper-swarm:
503 busyis sent again after Retry-After (up to 10 sends or 30 s, then a finding); busy retries and peak in-flight lane posts are reported;half_bodysends a loopback Host. - sigelo.ai, Enterprise: coming soon, like Pro; new "Run your own relay": the open-source relay closed to your operators, its 12-character codes, and listing it in the signed registry (checked by hand).
- sigelo.ai, translations: a per-language glossary as the build reads i18n/ (IA in Romance languages, the language's quotation marks); percentages as the locale writes them (tr %20); a stale page keeps its language.
v0.1.9 — 2026-10-20
- Keeper:
/delegatederives on its own labelsigelo/v1/delegate/<i>/…: on K_1 it handed out enrolled worker i's key. New log lines carry"kdf": "delegate/1"; old lines keep the old label. - Keeper: the token is checked before the one-at-a-time queue; POSTs must be
application/jsonfrom a loopback Host with no Origin; the queue is capped at 32 (503busy). 50 token-less posts: 10.9 s → 0.47 s. - Keeper init: the agent's token goes to its own file (
--agent-token-file), never the keeper directory; as root, system units withUser=(two users); the single-user layout is the weaker one;doctorwarns. - Relay: the all-networks brakes for short-code lookups and gift tries keep their ceilings (600/10 min, 300/h) but no network takes over 1/8, and 1/8 is held back so a network not seen this window still gets one try.
- Inbox log: what
inbox,watch,uiand MCP hand out is first written to<identity>.inbox.log(0600, newest 500);history [--since]andsigelo_historyprint it again, no relay. - Received files: one folder per contact by DID hash; a file of the same name is never written over (
<sha8>-2-<name>); characters NTFS refuses are stripped; Windows device names get_. send <name> -: a final CRLF is dropped whole (it left\r); multi-line stdin tested byte for byte.watch's 200-character line says how much was cut. The remote MCP says it needs no login and keeps nothing.- Agent-facing first screens lead with the utility: llms.txt, index.json, the MCP instructions, adopt.md, README, QUICKSTART and relay.json say what an agent gains before how it works.
- wire: a binding whose
idprecedes the last recovery in the chain issuperseded, never paid; positional, not byiat(SPEC §6.1, vectorbundle_recovered). Review 2026-10-19, HIGH 1. - wire: a payer accepts an invoice only from the chain's current DID (SPEC §6.3).
- wire: every rotation carries
sig_next, the next key's countersignature; missing is fatal, wrong is not a candidate (SPEC §7, vectorgraft_voluntary_into_foreign_genesis). Review 2026-10-19, MEDIUM 1. rotate()takesnext_secret(the countersigning key): an API change for every caller.- wire: Monero address keys of small order make a binding
discarded(SPEC §6.2, vectormonero_view_key_small_order). - wire: a
provenmonero binding reportsnetwork;verifydoes not refuse it (SPEC §6.2, §9.1). - Published issuer chains without
sig_nextneednode world/server.mjs countersignby the issuer key before new verifiers accept them; the earliestsigelo/0freeze moves to 2026-11-19 (VERSIONING §1). - contact/enrol: the worker identity goes only to the DID that paired through the code (
carrier.answeredBy); a contact that learnt the code's secret could prove it over its own pairing and take the worker's key. - contact/enrol: new refusals
enrol_unpaired,enrol_from; the inviter'spairedevent names the code's nonce (invite). External review 2026-10-19, HIGH 2. - Low-trust own agents:
enrol --tier friend|quietsets the trust at enrolment (kept by a restore);contacts,sigelo_contactsand the page showoursbesidetier: yours by key, its messages wait in the inbox. - Keeper, logins off the command line: RPC and daemon logins go into a 0600
wallet-rpc.conf(--config-file);doctorfails a login onExecStartor a config file not 0600. Review 2026-10-19, HIGH 3. - Keeper, RPC login works: wallet-rpc's digest nonce holds for one connection and the retry opened another, so a wallet-rpc with an RPC login always answered 401. One kept-alive socket per call.
- Keeper, choosing a daemon:
https://→--daemon-ssl enabled(--daemon-ssl-fingerprintpins);--daemon-proxyfor Tor (.onionwithout one refused);--daemon-login-file(0600). README "Choosing a daemon". - Keeper, doctor:
--trusted-daemonon loopback only; warns when own and public nodes mix in the fallback list; refuses onion with clearnet; checks the daemon port against the network. - Recovery kit:
clean_host.proxy/daemon_ssl; the runbook says own node or Tor for a restore.
v0.1.8 — 2026-10-18
- Transport default
auto: 8883 for 5 s, then MQTT over WebSocket on 443, so an HTTPS-only network needs no setting;SIGELO_RELAY_TRANSPORT=mqtts|wsspicks one;HTTPS_PROXY,NO_PROXYapply. - Contact over quota: named as such (
side: "reader"). - Relay: MQTT over WebSocket at
/mqttbehind nginx, counted byX-Real-IP;quota_storagesays whose quota (side); relay.jsonendpoints. New dependency:ws. - Relay: disk use is measured as
dfdoes,used / (used + available); before, root's reserved blocks (ext4's 5 %) counted as used andrelay_fullcame near 65 % real use. The free tier's ceiling agrees. - ceremony
--humanscreen: a 12-letter word ("verification") ran into the next number; the column is one wider. - AgentCard operator: the card profile's
params.operatorcarries the operator attestation and chain undersig; verify reports{did, exp}or refuses by name; signing goes through the key providers. - PAP profile draft:
integrations/pap/: a DID as PAP 0.1'sclient_id, bundle + §5.2 answer asclient_assertion, checked offline;--pairwise: one DID per business. Issue drafted, not posted. - Web Bot Auth:
integrations/web-bot-auth/signs HTTP requests (RFC 9421) with the identity key viasigelo-agent sign-http, serves the key directory with the bundle, verifies offline. Cloudflare's vectors pass. - Key agent (K3):
sigelo-key-agent(keyagent/) holds identity keys and signs known bodies over a 0700 socket;keys to-agent,SIGELO_KEY_AGENT; no rotation throughsign. - Key providers (K1): every signature goes through one signer (
sigelo-agent-keys.ts);keys status; an optional"provider": "file"in the identity file; other forms refused by name. Files, DIDs unchanged. - Key providers (K2):
initseals the key under the OS keychain where one answers, else a plain file and a warning;keys wrap,keys unwrap --plain. ChaCha20-Poly1305, vector infixtures/wrap-v1.json. - Pro gift codes:
sigelo-agent pro redeem PRO-K7F3-Q9ZPmakes the operator's pool Pro for 1, 6 or 12 months (POST /gift); the relay holds each code's hash only, totals on/stats.
v0.1.7 — 2026-10-15
- Status: new and experimental: the page (
sigelo-agent ui),watch, tiers, files, enrolment and the seed-derived operator identity. Wiresigelo/0unchanged; keeper stagenet-only; no outside review yet. - Files:
sigelo-agent send-file <contact> <path>and MCPsigelo_send_filesend up to 8 MiB end-to-end (sigelo-file/0: a manifest, then 256 KiB chunks, one login). - Files received:
inboxchecks size and SHA-256 and saves the file 0600 under<identity>.files/<contact>/, never opened. - Files queued: wait in
<identity>.files/.out/(0600), not in the state file; removed once sent, refused or the contact forgotten. - Expired answers, while waiting: a code that expires during
accept --waitis refused then (code_expired), not reportedwaiting;inbox --waitends on apairing_failed. sigelo-agent ui: a page on 127.0.0.1 for your own DID: contacts (Mine, Contacts, tags), short codes with the four words, messages, your agents enrolled and paired (adapters/moadim/UI-API.md).- Own agents, derived from your seed:
enrol --name <n>makes worker i of your keeper root (agentIdentitySeed(K, i, n), 90-day attestation) and prints a one-time code (adapters/moadim/ENROL.md). - Enrolment on the server:
init --enrol <code>pairs like any contact, then its identity is replaced with worker i, sent once end to end (THREAT-MODEL §2.11). - Enrol options:
--hereputs the worker in the agents' directory for a sub-agent;--restore i [--rotate]places it again from the words. Theenrolledcontact flag is gone. - Your identity from your words:
sigelo-agent keeper --from-wordswrites the keeper root and the operator identity, the root identity of the 25 words (identitySeed(S, n)), so they restore the same DID. - Derived identity guards: a random identity in the way is refused (
--replace-mesets it aside);--rotate-mederives the next key androtaterefuses a derived one. ui --recovery/--no-recoveryare gone: runkeeper --from-wordsonce (adapters/moadim/ENROL.md).- The page's Enrol replaces "Make mine":
POST /api/agents/enrolmakes a local agent worker i (old files set aside, its contacts warned) or renews a worker;POST /api/agents/mineis gone. - Contact tiers: each contact is
own(detected: an operator attestation from you or your operator),friend(default) orquiet;sigelo-agent tier <contact> own|friend|quiet. - Tiers elsewhere:
accept --tier friend|quiet,inbox --tier own,friend [--quiet-too]; MCPsigelo_set_tier,tier/tierson accept and inbox; the page asks friend or quiet and groups Mine by tier. - Operator hints (
sigelo-operator/0): agents of one operator, and the operator, find each other own through blinded hints; other contacts learn only operator DIDs they guess (THREAT-MODEL §2.12). - Operator proofs: taken only when asked for and only for the sender's current DID (a chain rotated into a
sibling's genesis is refused); a renewed attestation is proved again;
sendrefuses the label. - Older agents: one on an earlier version shows operator hints as messages labelled
sigelo-operator/0. - sigelo-contact API:
cancelInvite(code),rename(who, name),clockOffset()/checkClock();contacts()addspair,chain,tier_by,prekeysandwaiting. - The page reads
inbox(): its carrier state no longer piles up 1,000 events; a file received shows as a message. sigelo-agent watch: stays connected, so an invite completes by itself when accepted; own messages go to--on-message, friends' as a notice to--on-notice, quiet ones wait.watchhooks:--on-pairingtoo (adapters/moadim/WATCH.md). Beside a watcher,inboxreads without logging in.- One owner per identity: beside
watch, CLI and MCPsend/send-filequeue for it andinboxreads what it got; other relay verbs, and all besideui, refusebusy. No more 10 s session fights.
v0.1.6 — 2026-10-14
- Refusals: each says what failed and what to do next, and how a code was read (short or long) and where it broke;
SIGELO_DEBUG=1adds the identity file, relay, cause chain and stack. - CLI exits: 0 done, 1 refused or offline, 2 usage or no identity, 3
inbox --expectwith none;adopt --rotationwithout an identity no longer crashes. - Corrupt identity file: named, with "restore it from your copy"; no longer told to run
init, which makes a new identity. - MCP: every refusal carries
structuredContent{code, message}: a stable code beside its one line, never a stack. - Short codes:
short_expis the relay's expiry, not this clock's; a short code spent and then refused prints its long code to keep and accept (MCPlong). - Expired answers: an answer whose code ran out before the inviter replied is reported:
pairing_failedcode_expiredininbox, incontacts(failed) and in MCP. - Relay 0.1.4: every 429 sends
Retry-After, the seconds until its window frees; the client names that wait. - Four words: the same words mean no mix-up and no casual swap; a relay spending GPU time on a swap is caught by the 32-digit pair id (THREAT-MODEL §2.10).
- Site: Monero only, "Contact us for a quote" (terms §6, Pro, For agents); no euro invoice.
v0.1.5 — 2026-10-14
- Short invite codes:
inviteprints an eight-character code (K7F3-Q9ZP: case-insensitive, no look-alike letters, ten minutes, one use) to say on the phone or type from a note;accepttakes it or the long code. - Four words: after pairing both sides show the same four words (
contacts,accept,inbox) to compare aloud; the 32-digit pair id is the strong check (THREAT-MODEL §2.10). invite --long: the one-line code, for agent channels; it never touches the relay before it is answered.- MCP:
sigelo_invitereturns the short code beside the long one (long: truefor the long only);sigelo_accepttakes either; four words in accept, inbox and contacts. - Relay 0.1.3:
POST /parkandGET /park/<hash>hold a long code under a short code's hash, in memory only, fetched once; lookups 20 per 10 minutes per network and 600 per 10 minutes on the whole relay. - Clock skew: an inviter whose clock runs ahead of the relay's still parks its short code.
v0.1.4 — 2026-10-14
- After a theft: messages signed by a key the owner's recovery overruled are refused, even ones that arrived just
before it;
inboxand MCPsigelo_inboxreport them (refused, codere_pair). - No lost first send: after
no_readerthe message stays queued with the sender and goes at its nextinboxorsend.sendright afteracceptreads the inviter's reply first. - CLI:
inviteprints the bare code (--jsonfor more);accept --namerenames on a re-pair, default the DID's first digits;erase-requestsigns a data request;recovery-keywritesrecovery.pubtoo. - CLI exits:
--version;whoamiwithout an identity exits 2; Node older than 22.18 refused; a replayed code at once. - Retention: 14 days, or what
relay.jsonsays. Relay 0.1.2: free tier 3,000 messages a day, 14 days, 512 KB. - Site: stolen-key steps on agents.md and llms.txt; connect.md as 0.1.4 behaves; erasure by
erase-request. - Frameworks:
integrations/README.mdgives a config line, status and date for 30+ agent frameworks, Kimi Code, Qwen Code, Trae and DeepSeek Harness among them; sigelo.io/frameworksis the page form. - No MCP:
integrations/JOIN.md: the CLI sidecar, stdio MCP, and the raw path. - Agent card profile (draft): a DID and bundle in an agent card extension, signed by the identity key, with a
30-line verifier on the
sigelopackage (underintegrations/). - README.zh-CN.md: the protocol part in Simplified Chinese.
- Relay stats:
GET https://relay.sigelo.ai/stats, the relay's counts, no identifier, 30 days of daily totals. - Visit counts: sigelo.ai keeps a web access log, addresses cut to /24 or /48, no query string, 7 days (privacy
page updated); statistics behind a password at
/_stats/. Still no cookies and no scripts.
v0.1.3 — 2026-10-14
- Recovery key:
sigelo-agent recovery-key [--out <file>]writes the secret (0600) and prints the public key forinit --recovery;recover --recovery-key <file>signs the recovery rotation. Nothing else needed. - Recover after a fork:
recoversigns from the last honest node (the last recovery's, else the genesis): it beats a stolen copy's rotation from a node the owner also rotated from, unseen by the relay. - After a recovery: both sides mark the contact
re_pair(contacts, MCPsigelo_contacts) and send only the rotation notice under the old pairing key, claiming no new mailbox, until a new code pairs them. - Queued before a recovery: a message is refused, and
inboxreports it (refused, codere_pair). A contact on sigelo-agent 0.1.2 follows the recovery but marks nothing: pair with it again at once. - Exit codes: a refused, locked-out or offline verb exits 1, the check on stderr, any JSON on stdout (
inbox: 0 if it printed messages, now taken); no identity exits 2;inbox --expectexits 3 when none came. - First login: a stderr line before the proof of work (5–60 s) and one after; docs say Node 22.18 or newer, tested on 24.
- Fixture:
carrier-v0.jsonadds framenotice_recovery, a kind 4 notice carrying a recovery (identity B2); every earlier byte is unchanged. - Site: sigelo.ai's quick start is the live test's, with
recovery-key(new here, not run in that test) in place of its keygen one-liner:recovery-key,invite --name,accept,inbox,send.
v0.1.2 — 2026-10-14
- Status: contacts and the relay are new, no outside review yet; the keeper stays stagenet-only; wire
sigelo/0may change until v0.2. - Contacts (
contact/, MIT): invite codes, a contact store keyed by the original DID, end-to-end encrypted envelopes (hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM-768, prekeys, epoch chains) and an MQTT carrier; fixtures pin every byte. - Relay: agents log in with their identity, keep private pairwise mailboxes and get messages while offline; AGPL-3.0,
own repository
csigelo/sigelo-relay, at relay.sigelo.ai; free per agent, Pro per operator. - npm:
sigelo-contactjoins the five packages, in lockstep at 0.1.2. - Sidecar: contact verbs ship in
sigelo-agent, which depends onsigelo-contactand loads it only from its own install. - MCP: the stdio server lists contact tools when
sigelo-contactis installed; the Claude plugin bundle leaves them out. - Site: sigelo.ai is the relay's home; sigelo.net and sigelo.online redirect there, sigelo.dev to sigelo.io; HSTS one year; titles, descriptions, structured data and a 404 page; stale footnotes removed.
- Keeper: the vendor-chain licence check is shared with the relay (
spend/licence.tsunchanged in behaviour).
v0.1.1 — 2026-10-04
Status: first signed release (SSH-signed tags,
release.json); GitHub pre-release; wiresigelo/0may change until v0.2; the keeper is stagenet-only; no outside review yet.npm: first publish, all five packages at 0.1.1 under
csigelo, byte-identical to the release tarballs; the MCP registry entry now lists npmsigelo-mcpbeside the remote.Mirror:
site/deploy/mirror-release.shcarriesrelease.json(checked against the tag and SHA256SUMS), sorelease/verify-release.sh <tag>works from sigelo.io.MCP:
sigelo_forget_issuer(CLIforget-issuer) drops a retired issuer's attestations and genesis from the identity file: holder-side, after an out-of-band rotation notice (SPEC §5).World: issuer rotated 2026-10-03 after a seed exposure: new DID in SECURITY.md, chain at
/world/rotations.json, old DID retired; the 24 h re-issue never replays a retired issuer's attestation.Provenance gate (prototype): signed instructions (
ctx: "sigelo/instruction") gate shell and write tools in Claude Code and Hermes; root-owned hooks, taint after reads, deny on error (6df8a59,be75ec3).CI: the
DEVICE_STRINGSsecret is deleted; CI checks generic shapes only; the identity gate runs locally before every push (a1b944e).Releases: mirrored at
sigelo.io/releases/<tag>/against SHA256SUMS; from v0.1.1 an SSH-signed tag plus arelease.jsonattestation, checked byrelease/verify-release.sh(62407e2,709f412).Site:
/privacywith terms; SECURITY.md lists the official channels; mail is receive-only, replies go over SimpleX (62407e2,709f412).
2026-10-02
- Licence check: vendor genesis pinned, vendor chain verified from the licence, longest-chain rule, term ≤ 3 years; legacy files warned (
dba9b9e). Vendor ceremony procedure published (release/vendor-ceremony.md). - Spec coverage: vectors for §7.2
hash(next_genesis) == nextand a sixth-key challenge test in both suites (9cd82d0). - ts = go messages: 2,960-case mutation differential, 0 result or message differences after
4e1c8d2. - Hygiene: SPDX MIT headers on every source file (
fe4e8ac); spend suite runs offline withSIGELO_TEST_NO_LIVE=1(00af8e4). - Reproducible tarballs: gzip normalised so SHA256SUMS no longer depend on the Node version (
8e197df). - Docs halved: every public README cut to commands-first with budgets enforced in CI (
docs-test/check-budgets.mjs). - Drill 2: freeze in 6 s, keeper identity recovered offline from the root, fees 2.4 %; freeze.sh now kills every keeper on the policy (
bce9114,6099880). - Gate pass 3: orphan-process kill, background denylist, TUI paste fix, session-scope taint, HARDENING.md (
297501c).
v0.1.0 — 2026-10-02 (draft)
- Status: first tagged release (GitHub pre-release, unsigned); wire
sigelo/0may change until v0.2; the keeper is stagenet-only; no outside review yet.
2026-10-02, up to the tag
- World:
sigelo.io/world/issues §5.2 challenges,admission: "open"and 90-day self-reported conformance attestations;POST /world/verifyreturns §9.1 (5191235,4088ce2). - MCP: remote server at
https://sigelo.io/mcp(Streamable HTTP), one tool,sigelo_verify(4088ce2). - Accept:
accept/drop-ins for node, Python and Go:challenge(did, ctx)andaccept(challenge, answer, bundle)(3d741c6). - Hermes: adapter through MCP config, no code (
7475a5c); upstream A2A authenticator hook proposal drafted (1cbfaf6). - CI: a missing
DEVICE_STRINGSsecret warns instead of failing (d5e1428). - Site: eight pages under word budgets the site test enforces; Markdown twins via
Link: rel=alternate, IndexNow, AI crawlers in robots.txt (978fad6,6273d0e). - Analytics: from nginx logs only; addresses cut to /24 or /48, 30-day retention, no cookies, no third party
(
83bcac7).
2026-10-01
- Keeper:
sigelo-spend init,doctor,receipts export,licence; paid verbs need a licence attestation verified offline;initrequires a wallet-rpc binary (17e7787,eb9f428,194fd86). - Keeper recovery:
initcommits the keeper genesis to the root recovery key;sigelo-spend init --adoptrestores the same DID after a compromise (164b8c4,cc0a83c). - Keeper: builds wait 180 s; a build outliving its wait answers
TRY LATER wallet_slowand is never relayed (98ea994). - Soak:
freeze.sh/unfreeze.shhold a burnt keeper down; drill fixes to vault sync andgen-keys.mjs; a test licence, warned 30 days before expiry (c38b9e3,1b574ac,5b4a488). - Kit:
sigelo-recovery-kit0.1.0: offline ceremony, printed procedure, drill schedule and grader; the vendor never holds a key (ad970a5,9f75a7d). - Site: static, agent-first, generated from the tree:
.mdtwins,llms.txt,index.json, JSON-LD;/contact(0a4381f,4bf622b,3c2d364,a52163e). - Deploy:
site/deploy/server setup, atomic deploy with rollback, live checks; sigelo.io live (ca39b0e). - Release: public at
github.com/csigelo/sigelo;release/publish.shupdate mode adds onesync:commit (8a024b3). - CI: green on Linux, macOS and Windows, Node 22 and 24; Windows skips systemd and POSIX-mode checks (
1bcb01f,0fbd592,a71fb06). - Names: domain sigelo.io, account
csigelo, Go modulegithub.com/csigelo/sigelo/go, mail contact@sigelo.io (8cde486,f85a42a,724a903).
2026-09-29 (evening)
- Docs: QUICKSTART gives the exact
ed25519-testbind()call, a Timestamps paragraph and the recovery-beats-iatexample (a795275). - Ceremony:
--humanshows the 25 words on the terminal only;restore --wordsreads a file or stdin;--importneeds--i-know-this-seed-was-cold(278e87c,29a0402). - Monero: FCMP++/Carrot keeps the 25-word root (ROADMAP §2); the wallet-rpc canary accepts 1.30–1.33; unused
get_tx_keyremoved (085bf06,ba825f3). - Export: placeholders replace real stagenet subaddresses and oracle signatures; host specifics removed from
docs (
5e96d29,77a7be4,78878b6,da03f18).
2026-09-29
- wire: an envelope has exactly its defined keys; an extra key discards an item and is fatal in a rotation
(
bcee912, SPEC §3.1; vectorsbinding_envelope_extra_key,fatal_rotation_envelope_extra_key). - Keeper: token changes apply per request, no restart (
37190c5);SIGELO_DAEMONSswitches daemon after three connection failures or a 20-minute stuck height (e9b4970). - Spec: a duplicated attestation counts twice; a retired world key keeps minting valid attestations until they
expire (
5cde1ac). - Soak: hourly
check.mjs --notifyalerts; agent ticks wait for NTP sync (246fd66,4ec79b2). - Crosscheck: JCS, base58, addresses, 25-word seeds and Ed25519 against third-party references; no divergence
(
0a17aa3). - Sim: dishonest worlds, nested delegation and live policy edits (
ecb7f17,4d14292,ddff500). - Release:
release/build.shbuilds tarballs, staticsigelo-verifyand reproducible SHA256SUMS;pack-test.shinstalls them (20fd24e,7cdf4ea). - Conformance:
sigelo-verify --conformance --impl '<command>'grades a foreign implementation; weekly wallet-rpc canary (c4cef7d,4e1a5aa). - Docs: THREAT-MODEL §3.7a and INCIDENT §1 cover a wrong clock and an offline host (
7cefd5d).
2026-09-29 (soak incident #4)
- Keeper: refuses to sign (
503 clock_behind) on a clock behind its build floor or log; new TRY LATERwallet_offline; walletstoreafter each relay (7a91fdb,0fc50f5,f98b8cf). - Soak: outage ticks count as
outage, not MISMATCH;check.mjsflags no payment in 2 h, a stuck height or a bad log clock (9e5e35f,90de821,efa9f33).
2026-09-24, hostile-JSON differential
- wire: D1 JSON nesting is bounded at 512 levels (
425d2bb, vectorraw_fatal_depth_513_in_claims). - wire: S1
createdis exactlyYYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ, a real date (bc7165a, vectorfatal_genesis_created_leap_second). - wire: S2 key slots hold canonical points not of small order (
731483b, vectorfatal_genesis_key_all_zero). - wire: S3 the recovery commitment is
sha256:+ 64 lowercase hex (63cceed, vectorfatal_genesis_recovery_uppercase_hex). - wire: S4 a nonce is
z+ 1 to 63 base58btc digits (c5faf69, vectorfatal_genesis_nonce_z_hex). - wire: S5 noncharacters are a parse error (
001ecfa, vectorraw_fatal_noncharacter_in_claims_value). - Verifiers: base58 lengths bounded before decoding; TypeScript readers decode bytes fatally; no argument spread
over data; parse-error offsets agree (
1380098,b0d98d8,6498291,093abe0).
2026-09-24, self-review before the public export
- wire: A1 two identical rotation entries are a fork (
7c285ea, vectorfatal_duplicate_rotation_is_fork). - Verifiers: invalid UTF-8 rejects the whole document in ts as in go (
2d9227e); the 1f916 adapter checks the full genesis shape (8fa96e0). - Export:
release/publish.shmakes a single-commit export; its identity gate works on busybox and holds no pattern (41611f6,175be8f). - Soak: genesis nonces as bytes; a compat guard refuses a redeploy the verifier would reject (
200aeb5).
2026-09-17 to 2026-09-23 (wire sigelo/0)
- Spec: bundles carry
issuers; chain cycles rejected; §3.1 field tables; §5.2 challenge; §6.3 invoices; §9 takesnowand returns §9.1 (ef829d7,f1aba94,4de92b8,01d6347). - Spec: a malformed attestation or binding discards that item, identity faults stay fatal; §3.1 field types
enforced in both verifiers (
ceab548,e658348). - Spec:
monerobindings accept subaddresses, refuse integrated addresses and SigV1; points decoded as Monero decodes them (c4821e9,fcb8c54). - Implementations: TypeScript; Go reference verifier with one dependency; vector generator in TypeScript; Python
removed (
ff981a8,ea0b9a4,c4da3b6,00193b0). - Monero: MONERO.md design; Keccak, base58, addresses, subaddresses and SigV2 in ts and go (
05cf11c,4bdb430,6aea9c9). - Keys: the root is a Monero 25-word seed whose own wallet is the cold vault; keeper roots and agent identities
by HKDF, ts = go (
feb7e96,846b7cd,4f85df7). - Ceremony:
sigelo-offline ceremony|restore: age backup, fingerprint, keeper packages (c2202d8). - Keeper:
sigelo-spend: two-phase relay, fees inside caps, per-agent policy entries,refidempotency (7ae0836,3f642bd,85b0e27). - Keeper:
sigelo-walletagent verbs, delegation, approvals aboveapproval_above; run end to end on stagenet (fdaba3f,9e2756f,12408e6,8e554aa). - Keeper: the lane cannot freeze, names are never reused, one keeper per directory;
spend.locksurvives reboots; consistent API errors (57b57a4,44c614e,3b01de1). - Adapters: 1f916 world side; moadim agent sidecar with Monero commands (
4de92b8,d7d3349,7ae0836). - Docs: QUICKSTART and the mock world
examples/world.mjs(cd450a8,38e9c76).
v0.1 draft (wire sigelo/0) — 2026-09
- Spec: hashed genesis;
"sigelo\n" || JCS(body)signing; no floats; recovery beatsiat; commitment carried forward; forks rejected; unproven bindings labelled (cc2349d).